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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. The valuation of property by local county 
assessors does not require valuation by reference to "gold" 
dollars or other federally defined "standards of value." 
II. The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief 
sought by the Appellants. 
III. Appellants1 Cause of Action is Moot. 
DISPOSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Const, art. XIII Section 1(1) states: 
(Utah Const, art^ XIII Section 1(1)). . . 
All tangible property in the state, not 
exempt under the laws of the United States, 
or under this Constitution, shall be taxed 
at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to 
its value, to be ascertained as provided by 
law. 
Utah Const, art. XIII Section 3(1) states in pertinent 
part: 
(Utah Const, art. XIII Section 3(1))... 
The Legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment on all 
tangible property in the state, according to 
its value in money, except as otherwise 
provided in Section 2 of this Article.... 
Title 59. Chapter 5. Utah Code Annotated 1953. states 
in pertinent part: 
(Section 59-5-1))... 
All taxable property not specifically exempt 
under Article XIII, Section 2, of the 
Constitution of Utah, must be assessed at 
20% of its reasonable fair cash value; 
except that in providing the exemption for 
residential property provided for in Section 
2, residential property shall be assessed at 
15% of its reasonable fair cash value.... 
Title 59, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 states 
in pertinent part: 
Section 59-3-1(5) "Value" and "full cash 
value" mean the amount at which the property 
would be taken in payment of a just debt due 
from a solvent debtor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A* Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by Appellant to force the 
County Assessors of Salt Lake County and Utah County to value 
all tangible property according to its value in "gold" dollars 
and to recognize those "gold11 dollars as the only "standard of 
value." 
B- Previous Proceedings 
Dennis and Christine Baird, property owners residing 
in Salt Lake County, Utah challenged the value of real property 
located in Salt Lake County before the Salt Lake County Board 
of Egualization for tax year 1982. The petition of the Bairds 
was denied and that decision was timely appealed to the Utah 
State Tax Commission. A hearing was held before that body on 
May 12, 1983, and a formal decision was issued on July 5, 
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1984. The Tax Commission granted the County's Motion to 
Dismiss and the Bairds filed a timely appeal of that decision 
in the Tax Division of the District Court. At a hearing held 
before Third District Court Judge Dean E. Conder. the Counties1 
(Utah and Salt Lake) Motions to Dismiss were granted on the 
grounds that the Appellants had failed to state a claim for 
which relief could be granted. The Appellants timely appealed 
from that decision to this Court. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On or before May 15, 1982, the Salt Lake County 
Assessor valued the property of Dennis and Christine Baird 
located in Salt Lake County. Utah. The Appellants were 
notified of the value placed upon their property through the 
combined valuation and tax notice mailed to them by the Salt 
Lake County Treasurer on or before the 21st day of July. 1982. 
2. The assessed and fair market values set forth on 
the combined valuation and tax notice were expressed in dollars. 
3. Dollars, as utilized on the combined valuation 
and tax notice, was reflective of the value of a dollar in 
common circulation as currency or money in the United States 
(i.e. Federal Reserve Notes). The expression "dollars" used on 
the combined valuation and tax notice was not reflective of the 
value of Appellants property in "gold" dollars as defined in 31 
U.S.C Sec. 314 (19 ). Appellants Baird appealed the 1982 
valuation of their property to the Salt Lake County Board of 
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Equalization and in conjunction with Appellant Ferguson 
subsequently appealed to the Utah State Tax Commission and the 
Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court seeking in 
each instance a declaration that property must be valued 
according to its value in "gold" dollars. Appellants1 
petitions were denied or dismissed at all stages of the 
proceedings. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent, Salt Lake County Assessor, respectfully 
submits that all constitutional and statutory provisions were 
complied with in the valuation of Appellants1 property. The 
property was valued in accordance with its reasonable fair cash 
value, i.e. its value in money, as of January 1st of 1982. 
Respondent submits that it is not required under the applicable 
laws of Utah or of the United States to value property 
according to its value in "gold" dollars when such dollars are 
not the circulating medium of exchange or common money or 
currency of the nation. Respondent further submits that 
Appellants1 argument, when stripped to its core, is merely an 
attack upon the Federal Reserve system and thus constitutes a 
claim over which the Courts of the State of Utah have no 
jurisdiction. 
Appellants seek a declaration of the appropriate 
standard of value to be used in assessing local property. They 
seek to have this Court define that standard as the "gold" 
-4-
standard. All references to "gold" dollars as a "standard of 
value" were deleted by the U.S. Congress in Pub. L. 97-258. 
September 13. 1982. 96 Stat. 877. Accordingly, Appellants1 
cause of action is moot with respect to any year subsequent to 
1982. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY BY LOCAL 
COUNTY ASSESSORS DOES NOT REQUIRE 
VALUATION BY REFERENCE TO "GOLD" 
DOLLARS OR OTHER FEDERALLY DEFINED 
"STANDARDS OF VALUE." 
Appellants challenge the use of Federal Reserve tfotes 
as dollars in valuing their property for tax year 1982. All 
assessments of Appellants1 property were made on or before May 
15. 1982. and accordingly were not affected by Federal 
Statutory enactments occuring in September of that year. As 
all of the significant provisions of Title 31. U.S. Code upon 
which the Appellants rely were repealed effective September 13, 
1982. the argument in Point I below applies primarily to 1982 
and the application of a "standard of value" for that tax 
year. Point III of Respondents argument below deals with the 
mootness of the Appellants1 case in light of the repealer 
provisions of Pub. L. 97-258. 96 Stat. 877. effective September 
13. 1982. 
The responsibilities of local county assessors are set 
out in several constitutional and statutory provisions of the 
State of Utah. Specifically. Utah Const, art. XIII. Sec. 3(1) 
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states that: 
"The Legislature shall provide by law the 
uniform and equal rate of assessment on all 
tangible property in the state, according to 
its value in money, except as otherwise 
provided in Section 2 of this article." 
Utah Const, art. XIII, Sec. 1(1) provides that "All 
tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of 
the United States or this constitution, shall be taxed at a 
uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value to be 
ascertained as provided by law." Local county assessors are 
directed under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-4 (1953) to 
" — (B)efore the 15th day of May of each year ascertain all 
property in the county subject to taxation...and...assess the 
property to the person by whom it was owned or claimed...at its 
value...." Local assessors are further directed by Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 59-5-1 (1953) that: 
"All taxable property not specifically 
exempt under Art. XIII, Sec. 2 of the 
Constitution of Utah, must be assessed at 
20% of its reasonable fair cash value; 
except that in providing the exemption for 
residential property provided for in Sec. 2, 
residential property shall be assessed at 
15% of its reasonable fair cash value...." 
In performing these statutory obligations, the 
Legislature has provided guidance in reaching a definitipn of 
"value" and "full cash value." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-3-1(5) 
(1953). defines "value" and "full cash value" as follows: 
"value" and "full cash value" mean the 
amount in which the property would be taken 
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent 
debtor." 
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This language has been routinely and consistently 
interpretated by this Court as meaning the fair market value of 
the property in question or the price in money which would be 
agreed upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to 
sell and a purchaser willing to buy. Kennecott Copper 
Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 122 Utah 421. 250 P.2d 938 
(Utah 1952). As the Appellants stipulated in the District 
Court action that the Salt Lake County Assessor had accurately 
valued the Appellants' property according to its value in 
Federal Reserve Notes, no basis can exist for the Appellants 
challenge of the assessors valuation, unless that valuation is 
not a "valuation in money." Money has routinely been defined 
to include, however, all legal tender including coin, currency, 
bank notes and government notes. Generically it means any 
current circulating medium of exchange. Manufacturers National 
Bank v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company, 218 A.D. 
455, 218 N.Y.S. 332, reversed on other grounds 245 N.Y. 55, 156 
N.E. 95; Vick v. Howard, 136 Va. 101, 116 S.E. 465, 31 ALR 
240; Ferrell v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 487, 152 S.E. 901. 
United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d, 78-2 USTC 9534 (CA8, Mo. 
1978). Federal Reserve Notes are obviously legal tender and a 
current, circulating medium of exchange and accordingly meet 
the standards required of Utah constitutional and statutory 
provisions. It would be absurd to assert that local assessors 
are required to establish the value of each piece of property 
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within their counties according to its value in grains of gold 
and then convert that arbitrary and currency-based standard to 
"gold" dollars. The reality remains that the United States 
does not follow a gold standard or a silver standard and that 
local assessors must express the value of the property within 
their jurisdiction in terms of the current circulating medium 
of exchange. A similiar issue was addressed by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court in Middlebrook v. Mississippi State Tax 
Commission, 387 So.2d 726 (Miss.. 1980). In that case, the 
taxpayer had asserted that state income tax assessments were 
invalid because they were based on Federal Reserve Notes and 
not "gold" dollars. The Court rejected that argument as 
"without merit" on the grounds that "Congress has made the 
Federal Reserve Note the measure of value in our monetary 
system, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 412 (1968), and has defined Federal 
Reserve Notes as "legal tender for all debts, public and 
private, public charges, taxes, duties and dues." (31 U.S.C. 
Sec. 392 (1965))" Middlebrook, supra at 728. That conclusion 
is the only sensible and legally supportable conclusion which 
can be reached in this case. It is undisputed that the 
assessor appropriately assessed the property of the Bairds 
according to its value in Federal Reserve Notes. It is equally 
clear that those notes constitute money as the Courts have 
customarily interpreted that term and, accordingly, that the 
statutory and constitutional obligations of the assessor have 
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been met. The assessment by the Salt Lake County Assessor of 
the Appellants1 property according to its value in money, is 
legally correct and sufficient, and the judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
II. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO GRANT 
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS. 
The Respondent, Salt Lake County Assessor, 
respectfully submits that the State Courts of Utah lack 
jurisdiction over the issues raised by the Appellant. The 
original complaint and this appeal are nothing more than poorly 
concealed attacks upon the Federal Reserve system and have 
little or nothing to do with the system of property tax 
valuation adopted in the State of Utah. In a sweeping attack 
on the Federal Reserve system and what they believe to be the 
debased nature of Federal Reserve Notes, Appellants seek to 
have this Court lead the way in re-establishing the gold 
standard and banning the use of Federal Reserve Notes for 
official purposes within this state. Appellants have even 
asserted that by authorizing the valuation of property in other 
than "gold" dollars Utah.has run afoul of U.S. Const, art. 1, 
Sec. 10, by "mak(ing) anything but gold and silver coin a 
tender in payment of debts..." A similiar argument was raised 
before the Oregon Supreme Court in Leitch v. State Department 
of Revenue. 519 P.2d 1045 (Oregon 1974), in which a taxpayer 
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asserted that taxes of a metropolitan transportation district 
were unconstitutional because they were assessed and payable in 
Federal Reserve Notes. The Oregon Supreme Court quite 
succinctly noted "Plaintiff has no cognizible complaint in this 
regard, for it is the Federal Government, not the state, that 
has made "(a)11 coins and currencies of the United 
States — legal tender..." 31 U.S.C. Sec. 392 (Supp. 1972) ((Now 
31 U.S.C. Sec. 5103 (1983))." Leitch, supra at 1046. Just as 
the Plaintiff in Leitch attempted to translate a federal issue 
into a state court controversy. Appellants here have attempted 
to translate an attack on the Federal Reserve Bank system into 
a state property valuation issue. Appellants1 position, 
stripped to its essence, is little more than an attack upon the 
Federal Reserve system. It is clear that the proper forum to 
challenge the Federal Reserve banking system is the United 
States District Court, with both the United State of America 
and the Federal Reserve Bank joined as Parties-Defendants. 
Utah Courts lack jurisdiction to resolve the federal issues 
which are the subject of Appellants' complaint. Accordingly, 
the appeal should be denied and the judgment of the District 
Court affirmed. 
III. APPELLANTS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS MOOT 
While Appellants have only specifically challenged 
their valuations for the tax year 1982, they seek a declaration 
from the Court that the "gold" standard or "standard of value" 
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as defined in 31 U.S.C. Sec, 314 (19 ) is the standard of 
value by which ail property must be assessed by local county 
assessors. Appellants additionally assert that 31 U.S.C. Sec. 
311 (1972) defining "standard money" as "gold and silver" money 
is determinitive of the issue with respect to the duty of the 
assessor to value all property according to its value in 
money. Appellants fail to note that Pub. L. 97-258, 96 Stat. 
877. effective September 13. 1982. repealed 31 U.S.C Sec. 311 
(1972) and 31 U.S.C. Sec. 314 (19 ). No reference is made 
in the current Title 31 of the U.S. Code to any definition of 
dollars other than the general specifications for the design of 
coins set out in 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5112 (1983). It would thus 
seem that a final death knell has been struck to Appellants1 
argument that a gold based "standard of value" exists in this 
country. Certainly given the repeal of 31 U.S.C. Sec. 314 
(19 ) it would be unreasonable for this Court to grant 
Appellants' prayer for relief and "declare the dollar standard 
of value of 31 U.S.C. 314 to be the correct, official, 
constitutionally-acceptable Congressional standard of value." 
(Brief of Appellants, p. 32). 
CONCLUSION 
While the Appellants obviously strongly oppose the 
continued use of Federal Reserve Notes in contemporary society. 
that system may not be attacked in the state courts. The 
appropriate forum for such a challenge rests in the Congress of 
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the United States or in the Federal Court system. Certainly 
this current attempt to litigate that issue should be rebuffed 
by this Court and the judgment of the Third District Court 
affirmed. It is clear that the Respondent. Salt Lake County 
Assessor, has met his statutory and constitutional obligations 
by assessing the property of the Bairds according to its value 
in money as of January 1. 1982. While Appellants may abhor the 
existence and use of Federal Reserve Notes, the reality remains 
that they are legal tender and the circulating medium of 
exchange available to local assessors in arriving at fair 
market value. Respondent respectfully submits, therefore, that 
the actions of the Salt Lake County Assessor in valuing the 
property of the Bairds were legally sufficient and that the 
judgment of the District Court for tax year 1982 should be 
affirmed and Appellants1 cause of action for all future years 
declared moot. 
HESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this o?v day of April. 1986. 
T. L. "TED" CANNON 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
KARtf L. H E N D R I C K S O N ^ \ 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Attorney for 
Defendants-Respondents 
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